Exploring how government works and how voters and their elected representatives make decisions, this text responds to the media's negative portrayal of the cynical political atmosphere in America, suggesting that elected officials actually do tend to vote according to their constituents' interests.

IntroductionPart One: Political Participation1. Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting (1984)2. An Economic Interpretation of the History of Congressional Voting in the Twentieth Century (1985)3. Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections (1987)4. How Efficient Is the Voting Market? (1990)5. Voters as Fiscal Conservatives (1992)Part Two: Government and Regulation6. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation (1976)7. The Growth of Government (1980)8. Current Developments in the Economics of Regulation (1981)9. The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation (1989)10. George Stigler's Contribution to the Economic Analysis of Regulation (1993)Index